CP:

Text: The United States federal government should substantially reduce its military and police presence in South Korea, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kuwait.

Turkey Prolif

1. Maintaining credible US deterrence key to stop Turkish Proliferation
DAVID S. YOST, Professor of International Relations at the Naval Postgraduate School, 7-1-09, International Affairs, Volume 85, Issue 4, “Assurance and US extended deterrence in NATO” http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/122476701/abstract
Various potential WMD proliferation developments could strengthen the case for upholding US extended deterrence commitments in NATO and beyond. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran might influence decisions in nearby countries, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, regarding potential national nuclear weapons development or acquisition programmes. Maintaining the credibility of US extended deterrence protection might be critical to assuring the beneficiaries of US security guarantees that they may safely forego pursuing their own national nuclear capabilities. A related policy challenge of pivotal importance is determining how the United States and its NATO allies might deter Iranian efforts to employ nuclear weapons.20
2. Removing TNWs causes Turkey to develop nuclear weapons.
Bruno Tertrais, Senior Research Fellow, Foundation for Strategic Research, 9-26-2008. [Real Instituto Elcano, The Coming NATO Nuclear Debate, http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT
=/Elcano_in/Zonas_in/ARI117-2008]
Ankara deserves particular attention. The presence of US nuclear weapons on Turkish soil is fairly unpopular within the country, but the military elite view it as a significant component of their relationship with the US. The US nuclear presence reassures allies that might otherwise be tempted to go nuclear. A withdrawal could affect Ankara’s perception of its security if faced with a nuclear-capable Iran. Should this be the case, many observers agree that Turkey could consider a nuclear programme for itself. Turkey currently has a significant civilian nuclear research programme, but does not have the installations required for making fissile material. It would need to either construct a uranium enrichment plant or build a dedicated plutonium production reactor. This would require a break in its current nuclear policy. Furthermore, producing fissile material with such installations would imply a withdrawal from the NPT. To be fair, such an option would appear credible only if three conditions were met: a severe crisis of confidence between Ankara and Washington, a crumbling of the NPT regime and expectations that the EU will refuse to admit Turkey (for it is difficult to imagine the EU admitting in its ranks a new nuclear nation).

3. Turkish proliferation would snowball in the middle east leading to Nuclear War and Terror
Henry Sokolski, Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, 6-14-07, “The EU Facing Nuclear Weapons Challenges” http://www.npolicy.org/files/20070616-Sokolski-Talk-AixEnProvence-Conference.pdf
One country that might disagree with this view, though, is Turkey. It is trying to figure out how to live with a nuclear weapons armed neighbor, Iran; is disappointed by its inability to be fully integrated into the EU; and is toying with getting its own nuclear capabilities. Whether or not Turkey does choose to go its own way and acquire a nuclear weapons-option of its own will depend on several factors, including Ankara’s relations with Washington, Brussels, and Tehran. To a very significant degree, though, it also will depend on whether or not the EU Members States are serious about letting Turkey join the EU. The dimmer these prospects look, the greater is the likelihood of that Turkey will chose to hedge its political, economic, and security bets by seeking a nuclear weapons-option of its own. This poses a difficult choice for the EU. Many key members are opposed to letting Turkey join the EU. There are arguments to favor this position. Yet, if Turkey should conclude that its interests are best served by pursuing such a nuclear weapons-option, it is almost certain to fortify the conviction of Egypt, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia to do the same. This will result in the building up a nuclear powder keg on Europe’s doorstep and significantly increase the prospect for nuclear terrorism and war.

Turkey Politics

Turkey Politics: If the elections happened today, Erdogan would lose.
Gil Ronen, IsraelNationalNews staff writer, Last Updated, 6/6/2010, “Erdogan Poised to Lose Next Election, Expert Says,” http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/news.aspx/137906 vkoneru
Turkey's foreign policy shift away from friendship with Israel and the West may be a ploy by the country's prime minister to gain popularity for his party, which stands to lose the next election in July 2011, says a top expert on the region. The hostile stance taken by Turkey towards Israel is part of a major transformation of Turkey’s foreign policy, according to Begin-Sadat Center Director Prof. Efraim Inbar. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is turning away from the West, he explained, and moving closer to countries such as Sudan, Syria and Iran. However, “it is not a foregone conclusion that Turkey will persist in this direction,” Inbar said in a position paper: “Among Turkish society many still support the secular parties, which are far from pleased with the rush towards the Muslim world. Even among moderate Muslim quarters there is a sense of unease regarding the government’s policy pushing Turkey to join radical Islamic elements such as Hamas and Iran. One should also recall that Shiite Iran was an historic rival of the Sunni Turks.” (For an article on Turkey under Erdogan written by an Iranian freedom activist, click here.) Public support for the ruling Islamic party is in decline, the expert added, mostly due to corruption and abuse of civil rights. “Were elections held last week, the Islamist party would lose many seats, and two secular parties would possibly have made up the coalition. If current public opinion is held till the next elections, scheduled for July 2011, it is likely that Turkey will emerge with a new prime minister. It is possible that precisely due to his domestic situation as reflected in the polls, Erdogan has decided to exacerbate his relations with Israel in order to gain public support.” Prof. Inbar concludes that Israel “should stand its ground on Israeli vital interests” vis-a-vis Turkey. “Moreover, Israel should not tolerate insults. This will only be perceived as a weakness. Israel should distinguish between the Turkish state and society, and the current government that deserves a strong riposte. Firm, level-headed responses will be of assistance to pro-Western Turks in their domestic debate.”
TNWs and staging posts unpopular with the public – 72% against US presence
Claudine Lamond and Paul Ingram, British American Security Information Council, January 23, 2009, “Politics around US tactical nuclear weapons in European host states,” BASIC Getting to Zero Paper, www.atlanticcommunity.org/app/webroot/files/articlepdf/CLamondTNWinNATO.pdf vkoneru
There is a rising sentiment amongst the population for the removal of US nuclear weapons from Turkish territory. In a recent survey,[20] more than half the respondents stated that they are against nuclear weapons being stationed in Turkey. Almost 60% of the Turkish population would support a government request to remove the nuclear weapons from their country, and 72% said they would support an initiative to make Turkey a nuclear-free zone.[21] There may be several causes behind this sentiment, including the Iraq War, Turkish relations with neighboring states, budget expenditure and the moral concern over nuclear weapons. The historic precedence of Greece, a NATO member and Turkey's historic rival, ending its commitment to nuclear sharing in NATO may have further strengthened this tendency. There have been public expressions of resentment towards the US military presence in Turkey ever since the lead up to the US war with Iraq. The United States insisted on the government allowing American troops to use Turkey as a staging post, despite overwhelmingly antiwar Turkish public and political opinion. Limited permission was granted after heavy debates and delay in the Turkish parliament.
Erdogan will get credit for the plan
Lale Kemal, staff writer and columnist for today’s zaman, 6/20/2010, “What will Erdoğan do over nukes at the İncirlik base?,” http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/columnists-207467-what-will-erdogan-do-over-nukes-at-the-incirlik-base.html vkoneru
Erdoğan urged, once again, during a speech in Washington on Monday that a nuclear-free zone be established in Turkey's region, i.e., the Middle East, which in particular will include Israel. Erdoğan also said that Turkey does not want Iran or any other nation to have nuclear weapons.

CHP win key to EU accession
The Jerusalem Post, May 31, 2010, “Turkey’s game changer?,” lexis
The CHP has failed to come up with its version of moving Turkey forward, instead merely opposing the AKP. Subsequently, and ironically for a leftist party, the CHP has become the party opposing change - the party of "no." The implications of the dirty tactics against Baykal aside, the shake-up in the CHP's leadership presents the party with an unprecedented opportunity - Turkish leaders do not quit politics until they die - to introduce New Kemalism, a forward vision for a European Turkey. Kilicdaroglu has already voiced support for EU accession, and the talk in Ankara is that he is wooing prominent liberal, pro-EU Turkish diplomats who feel disgruntled with the AKP's foreign policy to join the CHP. If the CHP becomes the party of change, it can even mold Turkey in the image of leftist parties that took Portugal and Spain into the European Union while transforming and liberalizing their societies. New Kemalism's aim would be to boost traditional Kemalism's commitment to Turkey's European vocation while reguiding it toward more liberal values. In the early 20th century, Kemal Ataturk wanted Turkey to go West, and that remains Kemalism's goal. Europe, however, has moved even further West since then. Joining this new Europe, the EU of liberal values, has to be New Kemalism's driving mantra.
Turkey’s accession into the EU is key to peace and stability in Cyprus
Stefan Nicola, Staff writer for United Press International, June 13, 2005, United Press International, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, “Cyprus backs Turkey’s EU bid,” http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=109941&fuseaction=topics.item&news_id=132754 vkoneru
The accession of Turkey into the European Union is essential to solve the Cyprus problem, a senior Cypriot diplomat in Washington said Monday. "We are in favor of Turkey joining the EU," said Euripides Evriviades, ambassador of the Republic of Cyprus, at a luncheon hosted by the Nixon Center, a Washington-based think tank. "The EU solves problems by embracing them," he said, "it has managed to reunify the French and the Germans, and it will do it for Cyprus...Turkey joining the Union is fundamental for peace and stability and long-term prosperity in the region."A former British colony, Cyprus has been divided into the Republic of Cyprus -- the Greek Cypriot south -- and a Turkish-occupied north since Turkey invaded the Mediterranean island in 1974. Although only the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus joined the EU on May 1, 2004, every Cypriot carrying a passport has the status of a European citizen. EU laws, however, do not apply to the north, which has so far been recognized by Turkey alone. Evriviades said he hopes the rejection of the EU constitution in France and the Netherlands does not influence the timetable of the EU-accession talks with Ankara, which are scheduled to start Oct. 3. EU foreign ministers also approved an agreement on Monday adapting its customs union with Turkey to the 10 new EU member states, including Cyprus, bringing accession talks with Ankara a big step closer. Once Turkey signs the document, it will have met all the conditions to start the talks. In those talks, Cyprus hopes it will not get overlooked, as the issue is one that EU leaders have repeatedly stated they would like to be solved if Turkey wants to join the Brussels-based club. But the strategic interest of the United States in Turkey, a country that borders Iran and Iraq, might be disadvantageous to such a small country as Cyprus, the ambassador said. Evriviades criticized U.S.-lawmakers for what he felt would be an unjust foreign policy towards Nicosia: The ambassador said that in a Congress hearing earlier this year, it was said that "one politically risk-free option...for the United States to improve its relations with Turkey, is for the U.S. basically to deliver Cyprus." "How do you think I feel as a Cypriot," Evriviades asked, "if my own country is being used as an extension and a trump card for somebody else's foreign policy?" The Cypriot issue, which has seen repeated sparks of violent outbreaks over the last four decades, is also on the to-solve list of the United Nations. A U.N.-endorsed reunification plan facilitated direct talks between the leaders of both parties that culminated in a referendum last April. But while the Turkish north backed the plan, Greek Cypriotes overwhelmingly rejected the proposal.
Cyprus instability escalates to nuclear war
Tony Barber, Independent Staff Writer, 1/23/1997 “Europe's coming war over Cyprus: After 22 years of diplomatic stalemate, the world's most densely militarised confrontation zone may be about to explode, writes Tony Barber,” http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/europes-coming-war-over-cyprus-1284661.html // vkoneru
Just as EU foreign ministers sit down over lunch in Brussels to thrash out what to do, word arrives that four Greek Cypriots have been killed along the Green Line dividing government-held southern Cyprus from the Turkish-occupied north. The government, backed by Greece, retaliates by vowing to take delivery within a week of a batch of Russian S-300 anti- aircraft missiles ordered in January 1997. As a Russian-Greek naval convoy carrying the warheads and launchers edges towards the eastern Mediterranean, the Turkish armed forces swing into action. Troop reinforcements pour into northern Cyprus. Planes raid the Greek-built missile base near Paphos in south-western Cyprus. The Turkish navy prepares to blockade the island. Greece declares Turkey's actions a cause for war and, angry at lukewarm EU support, invokes the secret defence clause of a recently signed treaty with Russia. 9 to disputed Aegean islands on Turkey's coastline. The United States warns Russia not to get involved. President Alexander Lebed, with Chinese support, tells the US to mind its own business. All three powers go on nuclear alert. Like Cuba, another island involved in a missile dispute 36 years before, Cyprus has brought the world to nuclear confrontation.

Morality Frontline

The current world is one with shattered moral guidelines. Reliance on old traditions such as morality led to two world wars and the Holocaust, and now threatens annihilation.
Majid Yar, PhD, Lecturer at Lancaster University, 2002 (“From Actor to Spectator”, Philosophy and Social Criticism)
As Hutchings notes, philosophy (and the vita contemplativa as a whole) has an ambiguous status in Arendt’s thought, standing both accused and excused.81 On the one hand the apotheosis of the contemplative life as the highest form of human existence (cf. Plato) is blamed for the denigration of the world of action, appearance and political life. But on the
other hand, philosophy seems to be entrusted with the project of modernity’s salvation – is not Arendt herself a philosopher who seeks, with her diagnosis of the crises of modernity, to intervene in this decline and so help redeem the possibility of a more humane, just and free form of life? In her essay ‘Tradition and the Modern Age’ (1961) Arendt approvingly
cites Marx as one of the harbingers of the end of our tradition of philosophy; with his pronouncement that philosophy and truth do not stand apart from and above human existence but emanate from the world of humans, and find their realization therein, he effectively inverts the hierarchy of thought over action, contemplation over labour, and philosophy over politics which had stood from Plato onwards.82 Yet in rescuing politics from the philosophers Arendt finds herself in need of
rescue, for what role remains for the political philosopher? With her writing from the 1960s onwards – starting with her famous account of the Eichmann trial, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (1963) – Arendt begins to find a role for philosophy in respect of political life.83 And this role casts the philosopher as spectator (storyteller, narrator and historian) whose task it becomes to stand apart from the practical life of humans that he/she might pass judgment upon it. It can be fairly stated that covering the Eichmann trial brought Arendt most ineluctably into confrontation with the crisis or aporia of judgment. In judging Eichmann (and one must judge, one is ‘always already’ judging), Arendt confronts the question: on what basis can one judge the unprecedented, the incredible, the monstrous which defies our established understandings and experiences? It will be recalled that in human action Arendt recognizes (for good or ill) the capacity to bring the new, unexpected and unanticipated into the world. This quality of action means that it constantly threatens to defy or exceed our existing categories of understanding or judgment; precedents and rules cannot help us judge properly what is unprecedented and new. (It is precisely for this reason that from relatively early in her writings she eschews a judgment that subsumes particulars under universals in favour of Kant’s model which is not determinate, but instead proceeds from the particular for which a rule must be found.) So for Arendt, our categories and standards of thought are always beset by their potential inadequacy with respect to that which they are called upon to judge. However, this aporia of judgment reaches a crisis point in the 20th century under the repeated impact of its monstrous and unprecedented events. The mass destruction
of two world wars, the development of technologies which threaten global annihilation, the rise of totalitarianism, and the murder of millions in the Nazi death camps and Stalin’s purges have effectively exploded our existing standards for moral and political judgment.84 Tradition lies in shattered fragments around us and ‘the very framework within which understanding and judging could arise is gone’.85 The shared bases of understanding, handed down to us in our tradition, seem irretrievably lost. If we are to think and judge at all, it must now be ‘without preconceived categories and . . . without the set of customary rules which is morality’;86 it must be ‘thinking without a banister’. In order to secure the possibility of such judgment Arendt must establish that there in fact exists ‘an independent human faculty, unsupported by law and public opinion, that judges anew in full spontaneity every deed and intent whenever the occasion arises’.87 This for Arendt comes to represent ‘one of the central moral questions of all time, namely . . . the nature and function of human judgment’.88 It is with this goal and this question in mind that the work of Arendt’s final years converges on the ‘unwritten political philosophy’ of Kant’s Critique of Judgment

The call to morality destroys politics- their framing of the 1AC, grounded in the past, removes the thought behind modern politics and places decisions into the realm of abstract reason
Jeffery Isaac, Political Science Professor at Indiana University, 1989 (“Arendt, Camus and Postmodern Politics”, Praxis International)

Arendt discerns this authoritarian streak in modern theories of natural right. She writes of Kant’s Groundwork, for example, that “the categorical imperative is postulated as absolute and in its aboluteness introduces into the interhuman realm – which by its nature consists of relationships – something that runs counter to its fundamental relativity. The inhumanity which is bound up with the concept of one single truth emerges with particular clarity in Kant’s work precisely because he attempted to found truth on practical reason; it is as though he who had so inexorably pointed out man’s cognitive limits could not bear to think that in action too, man cannot behave like a god [emphasis added].”61 She sees this also in the deification of Reason characteristic of the philosophies of history which attended the French Revolution. But for Arendt these philosophies, however consequential, were primarily backward-looking. “For Vico, as later for Hegel, the importance of the concept of history was primarily theoretical. It never occurred to either of them to apply this concept directly by using it as a principle of action.’’ This latter move was left to Marx, who viewed the end of history as an end of human action, a principle of conduct. In Arendt’s estimation this vision, tied as it was to a utilitarian concern with “the social questions” of labor and wealth, was bound to result in the end of politics as a collective, deliberative enterprise:
In this version of deriving politics from history, or rather, political conscience from historical consciousness – by no means restricted to Marx in particular, or even to pragmatism in general – we can easily detect the age-old attempt to escape from the frustrations and fragility of human action by construing it in the image of making. What distinguishes Marx’s own theory from all others in which the notion of “making history” has found a place is only that he alone realized that if one takes history to be the object of a process of fabrication or making, there must come a moment when this “object” is completed, and that if one imagines that one can “make history,” one cannot escape the consequence that there will be an end to history. Whenever we hear of grandiose aims in politics, such as establishing a new society in which justice will be guaranteed forever, or fighting a war to end all wars or to make the whole world safe for democracy, we are moving in the realm of this kind of thinking.62 Thus for both thinkers modern political thought deifies Man; in the interests of universal reason and freedom it has licensed the suppression of difference and the denial of plurality; it is based upon an abstract, idyllic dream; its ultimate outcome is a philosophy of history which denies the present, postulates motion as the essence of man, and leans toward totality as an ideal. Milan Kundera, in his novel The Book of Laughter and Forgetting, captures this sense of a humanism intoxicated with itself in his ironic reflection on the seizure of power by the Czech communists in 1948: Say what you will – the Communists were more intelligent. They had a grandiose program, a plan for a brand-new world in which everyone would find his place ... and lost no time in turning their dream into reality . . . an idyll, for all. People have always aspired to an idyll, a garden where nightingales sing, a realm of harmony where the world does not rise up as a stranger against man nor man against other men, where the world and all its people are molded from a single stock and the fire lighting up the heavens is a fire burning in the hearts of men, where every man is a note in a magnificent Bach fugue and anyone who refuses his note is a mere black dot, useless and meaningless, easily caught and squashed between the fingers like an insect. From the start there were people who realized they lacked the proper temperament for the idyll . . . [and] they went behind bars. They were soon joined by thousands and tens of thousands more. . . And suddenly those young, intelligent radicals had the strange feeling of having sent something into the world, a deed of their own making, which had taken on a life of its own, lost all resemblance to the original idea, and totally ignored the originators of the idea. So these young, intelligent, radicals started shouting to their deed, calling it back, scolding it, chasing it, hunting it down. If I were to write a novel about that generation of talented radical thinkers, I would call it Stalking a Lost Deed.63
For Arendt and Camus the political practices engendered by modern humanism represent just such a lost deed.
In some respects this analysis of modernity seems itself historicist. Both thinkers, resolutely opposed to philosophies of history, which devalue contingency and concrete human judgment, seem to subscribe to just such a mode of thinking, whereby modernity bears the seeds of twentieth century totalitarianism in much the same way as an acorn bears the seeds of an oak. But I think it makes more sense to read them as simply identifying an optimistic essentialism at the heart of modern political thought which severely underestimated the capability of humans to practice self-deception and logical crime, and a blindness about ends and means which made possible, if it did not require, totalitarianism. Arendt herself denied that the emergence of totalitarianism was characterized by any inevitability, just as she insisted that “it is even more dangerous than it is unjust” to hold modern political theorists responsible in any meaningful sense for the horrors of the twentieth century.64 And Camus too consistently rejected any kind of historicism. It is thus, I propose, more useful to interpret Arendt and Camus as stalking a lost deed than as identifying some kind of historical necessity. There is, of course, independent evidence for this interpretation, for the historicist view is usually associated with a kind of Heideggerian or Straussian political conservatism and romantic nostalgia for the pre-modern past. Nothing could be farther from the spirit of


Arendt and Camus, for whom the reappropriation of modern humanism is the primary task of political theory and practice.65 3The “pillars of the best known truths”. . . today lie shattered; we need neither criticism nor wise men to shake them anymore. We need only look around to see that we are standing in the midst of a veritable rubble heap of such pillars. Now in a certain sense this could be an advantage, promoting a new kind of thinking that needs no pillars or props ... [But] long ago it became apparent that the pillars of the truths have also been the pillars of the political order, and that the world . . . needs such pillars in order to guarantee continuity and permanence, without which it cannot offer mortal men the relatively secure, relatively imperishable home that they need.66 It is essential for us to know whether man, without the help of either the eternal or rationalistic thought, can unaided create his own values.67 We are without political foundations. Contemporary history has exploded them.68 A deconstruction of modernity has laid bare their limits. We are, with Rorty and Lyotard, suspicious of Grand Narratives, skeptical of the state, and indeed, of politics altogether. At its most political, postmodernist theory has proposed what Lyotard calls an “agonistics” – the celebration of the sheer heterogeneity of local political struggles, and a refusal to propose any overarching criteria of legitimacy: political sans public life. At its least political, as in the work of Rorty, it has suggested an edifying and complacent conversationalism, one possibly suited to the armchair philosopher, but hardly up to the task of helping us to live in the world.


Political Action is a pre-requisite to freedom- the political sphere will always grant value to our lives.

George Kateb, Professor of Political Science at Amhurst College, 1977 (‘Freedom and Worldliness in the Thought of Hannah Arendt”, Political Theory V5 N2)

Freedom and worldliness can serve as the terms that stand for what Arendt prizes most. She regularly connects them; she sees them as dependent on each other. Freedom exists only when men engage in political action. Political action can take place only where there is a common commitment to the reality, beauty, and sufficiency of the world-of the world "out there." Political action looks to the creation or conservation or augmentation of a suitable world for itself, a polis or other entity, which is the scene and inspiration and source of meaning for political action. Put negatively, all the other activities of life, with the ambiguous exceptions of thinking (understanding), and contemplation, are not free, but done in bondage to one or another kind of master or done in unredeemable futility or impotence. All these activities, including thinking and contemplation, but with the exception of fabrication, artisanship, craftsmanship, artistic creation, and organized science, are not worldly, but private, either in the sense of being done in private or for private purposes, or in the sense of taking place inside oneself. Arendt covers unworldly activities with her distaste or scorn, or she acknowledges their necessity grudgingly and sometimes with shame, or she praises them in a way that at times keeps one off balance, so strained or unusual are the terms of her praise. She makes these things seem unreal or too real. To say, therefore, that political action alone is equal to the task of challenging Silenian wisdom is to say that freedom and worldliness are the values that alone make life worth living. Our condition is such that one of the highest tasks of philosophy is to make believable, to those who love philosophy, a view in which something other than philosophy-namely, political action-could present itself as worthy of perhaps an equal devotion. Arendt's mission as a philosopher should be recognized as the recovery of the idea of political action, in a culture which she thinks has lost the practice of it, and in which almost all philosophy is united, if in nothing else, in denying intrinsic value to it. At best, where there is not aversion, there is reluctance or condescension or indifference. The mere right understanding of political action-the understanding which men of action in the past had of what they were doing-is now, for the most part, absent. We can approach Arendt's defense of the primacy of political action by noticing, in a little detail, the judgments she makes of some nonpolitical things. The power of her thought to shock and alienate is shown vividly in these judgments. It is not that political action is simply the sole pale survivor of her work of criticizing and depreciating nonpolitical things-as if, provoked to deny what everybody else affirms, she at last finds one thing no one else praises and chooses to praise it. It is, instead, that her praise of political action derives some of its energy from the radical reevaluation of nonpolitical things. Which is to say that her commitment to the values of freedom and worldliness is basic: her double passion is to differentiate man from nature and save man from phantasm. Given this passion, her judgments about nonpolitical things and political action follow with equal necessity and equal force.

And, intervention is good:
Imperialist interests should not be allowed to compromise the United States’ moral obligation to intervene in genocide
Salih Booker and Ann-Louise Colgan, staff writers, 7/12/2004, (“Genocide in Darfur”, The Nation,
http://www.thenation.com/article/genocide-darfur)

Ten years after Rwanda, a genocide is unfolding again while the world watches and refuses to say its name. The failure of the United States and the international community to act in Rwanda a decade ago cost 800,000 lives. Now, up to 1 million people face a similar fate in Darfur, western Sudan, as a result of an ongoing government campaign to destroy a portion of its population. What is happening in Darfur is genocide, and must be called that. The term "genocide" not only captures the fundamental characteristics of the Khartoum government's intent and actions, it also invokes clear international obligations. Yet, as horrifying reports continue to emerge, and as a humanitarian emergency grows, there is no indication that the United States or the United Nations is prepared to intervene--despite promises of "never again" and explicit obligations under the 1948 Convention on Genocide. For more than a year, the Khartoum government has systematically obstructed access to Darfur and blocked international efforts to establish a relief program. More recently, it has failed to honor the cease-fire it signed in April. As a result, Darfur now faces the worst humanitarian crisis in the world, with 30,000 people already killed and more than a million internally displaced. International aid agencies say that even if humanitarian relief arrives now, 350,000 people may still die. Sudan, geographically Africa's largest country, has experienced civil war with only a ten-year pause since independence in 1956. More than 2 million people have been killed and twice that many displaced in the long-running war between successive governments of the north and peoples of the south. Recent progress toward peace has brought hope that this troubled history will finally come to a close, but the growing crisis in Darfur, which began last year, casts a dark shadow. In Darfur, the Sudanese government is destroying African Muslim communities because some among them have challenged Khartoum's authoritarian rule. As in the conflict between north and south, in Darfur ethnic and racial identities have also been part of the conflict. But at its heart is a repressive minority Arab-centric regime in Khartoum that rules by force, cannot even claim to represent a majority of northerners and has relied on religious fundamentalism to maintain its power. Ironically, the international community's unwillingness to intervene results--at least in part--from concern that a fragile peace deal between north and south will be jeopardized. Across several administrations, the United States has been involved in promoting peace in Sudan, and the Bush Administration is eager to claim credit for its diplomatic efforts. But as long as the Sudanese government is waging a genocidal war in Darfur, the United States cannot pretend that a meaningful peace deal can be achieved. The Administration had hoped that such an agreement would allow it to lift sanctions on Sudan. This, in turn, would permit US oil companies to pursue a share of the country's recently developed oil wealth. Such interests, however, cannot be allowed to compromise a larger moral obligation. As parties to the Genocide Convention, all permanent members of the UN Security Council, including the United States and more than 130 countries worldwide, are bound to prevent and punish genocide. The convention names genocide as a crime in international law, describing it as the commission of acts with "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group." The Security Council continues to hesitate on Darfur, largely because of the economic and diplomatic interests of its permanent members, who don't wish to antagonize Khartoum. Whether the UN can be spurred to action will depend largely on the United States, and Washington has an obligation to act. One reason is its treaty obligations under the Genocide Convention. Another is its involvement in Sudan's peace process, supported by an eclectic domestic constituency, including groups ranging from the evangelical right to the Congressional Black Caucus. A third is the unique US intelligence capacity to track militia activity in Darfur as well as the movements of the displaced. Finally, it has 1,800 troops in nearby Djibouti, some of whom could be mobilized quickly to lead a multinational force to secure the region, to facilitate humanitarian assistance and to enforce the cease-fire until a UN peacekeeping force can be assembled.

US has a moral imperative to intervene militarily in genocide- preventing genocide is the ultimate moral imperative
Cadet Anne Hsieh, 12/04, “When should we intervene?”, Army Proceedings, The Naval Institute, http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,NI_1204_Intervene,00.html)

There are unceasing opportunities for the United States to participate in humanitarian intervention operations—which it chose not to do in Rwanda in 1994. Confronted by women who were party to that genocide and seeking understanding, a West Point cadet proposes criteria for U.S. involvement. I sat in the middle of a cramped, deteriorating apartment room in the poorest section of Durban, South Africa, talking away the cool afternoon with the four refugee women I had met earlier. They had invited me to spend the afternoon with them, curious about a female officer-to-be in the U.S. Army. I had spent a few hours listening to their heartbreaking stories about witnessing the deaths of their loved ones in Rwanda, Burundi, and the Congo, when Elisabeth’s question silenced the room. Looking at me with innocent curiosity, she asked, “Anne, why does not the U.S. help our situation? There is so much bloodshed still. You are part of the most powerful army in the world. Can America do nothing?” Her earnest plea echoed off the walls. Why did the United States do nothing during those horrific months of 1994 in Rwanda, and practically nothing still ten years later? Why did Solange, sitting across from me, have to lose 11 of her family members in the Rwandan genocides, not to mention the similar losses of the two ladies sitting next to me, Petronille and Annonciata, in their own countries’ civil conflicts? After a moment of searching for an answer, I finally replied, “It is complicated.” Then, trying to shed as moral a light on the United States as possible, I explained—awkwardly, almost ashamedly—that involving ourselves in such situations did not always serve our national interests.
The end of the Cold War marked a fundamental change in U.S. security imperatives, as our focus shifted from deterring communist expansion to preventing the emergence of a new threat. A number of nation-states once held intact by the ideological standoff between the Eastern and Western blocs have since “gone bankrupt, and chaos exists.”__[1]__ The result has been a significant rise in regional conflicts throughout the world. Although these deadly intrastate conflicts may not directly threaten U.S. national security, they have other serious costs worth considering. Humanitarian crises take a significant toll in unjustified deaths, produce both financial and ideological support for terrorist groups, keep countries mired in economic misery, and cause massive refugee movements. Such damaging consequences not only create moral challenges to the common Western argument that democracies protect and promote human rights, but threaten international security as well.
The hegemonic role of the United States in international politics since the end of the Cold War further accentuates the moral and strategic relevance of humanitarian operations to our national security policy. G. John Ikenberry aptly describes our situation as the world’s sole superpower: The world is left with a confusing combination of new norms, old institutions, unipolar power, uncertain leadership, and declining political authority within the international community. Meanwhile, the United States—the one country with both the greatest political assets and the greatest liabilities in the service of concerted international action—is caught in its own debates about its interests and obligations within the international order.[2]
In light of the goals of the 2002 U.S. National Security Policy, which asserts that the United States will champion aspirations for human dignity, work with others to defuse regional conflicts, and expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy, it is evident that formulating policy regarding humanitarian and peace operations has become increasingly important to our national interest.__[3]__ Nevertheless, cases in which military intervention may be the only way to prevent human slaughter often do not concern, and may even oppose, the nation’s vital interests. Our dilemma arises when certain absolute moral imperatives call us to act anyway. For example, genocide should be recognized universally as immoral. However, U.S. foreign policy traditionally has followed realist “power politics” thinking, where national interests always overrule humanitarian ones. Hence, in Rwanda in 1994, the United States refrained from taking action when more than half a million people were slaughtered by primitive methods in only six weeks, and 15,700 cases of rape were reported (the actual figure may have been 250,000 to 500,000).[4] The extremity of the genocide in Rwanda not only serves as an example of universal moral injustice, but also shows how humanitarian crises are fraught with moral complications for other countries that have an ethical responsibility to intervene.

UTIL:

They link back to their criticism of morality
Jeffery C Isaac Professor of Political Science at Indiana-Bloomington, Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life, 2002, PhD from Yale, Dissent Magazine, Vol. 49, Iss. 2, “Ends, Means, and Politics,” p. Proquest
As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that U.S. military intervention is an act of "aggression," but no consideration is given to the aggression to which intervention is a response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but rather terrorist violence abetted by a regime--the Taliban--that rose to power through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most "peace" activists would prefer not to ask: What should be done to respond to the violence of a Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Taliban regime? What means are likely to stop violence and bring criminals to justice? Calls for diplomacy and international law are well intended and important; they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of global order. But they are also vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of how diplomacy or international law can work effectively to address the problem at hand. The campus left offers no such account. To do so would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is of limited utility. Here what matters is not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise of power. Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

Util is inevitable even with deontology
Joshua Green Assistant Professor Department of Psychology Harvard University, Joshua, November 2002 "The Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Truth About Morality And What To Do About It", 314
Some people who talk of balancing rights may think there is an algorithm for deciding which rights take priority over which. If that’s what we mean by 302 “balancing rights,” then we are wise to shun this sort of talk. Attempting to solve moral problems using a complex deontological algorithm is dogmatism at its most esoteric, but dogmatism all the same. However, it’s likely that when some people talk about “balancing competing rights and obligations” they are already thinking like consequentialists in spite of their use of deontological language. Once again, what deontological language does best is express the thoughts of people struck by strong, emotional moral intuitions: “It doesn’t matter that you can save five people by pushing him to his death. To do this would be a violation of his rights!”19 That is why angry protesters say things like, “Animals Have Rights, Too!” rather than, “Animal Testing: The Harms Outweigh the Benefits!” Once again, rights talk captures the apparent clarity of the issue and absoluteness of the answer. But sometimes rights talk persists long after the sense of clarity and absoluteness has faded. One thinks, for example, of the thousands of children whose lives are saved by drugs that were tested on animals and the “rights” of those children. One finds oneself balancing the “rights” on both sides by asking how many rabbit lives one is willing to sacrifice in order to save one human life, and so on, and at the end of the day one’s underlying thought is as thoroughly consequentialist as can be, despite the deontological gloss. And what’s wrong with that? Nothing, except for the fact that the deontological gloss adds nothing and furthers the myth that there really are “rights,” etc. Best to drop it. When deontological talk gets sophisticated, the thought it represents is either dogmatic in an esoteric sort of way or covertly consequentialist.

Util good
Only consequentialism solves competing moralities
James Wood Bailey “Oxford University Press; 1997“Utilitarianism, institutions, and Justice” pg 9

A consequentialist moral theory can take account of this variance and direct us in our decision about whether a plausible right to equality ought to outweigh a plausible right to freedom of expression. 16 In some circumstances the effects of pornography would surely be malign enough to justify our banning it, but in others they may be not malign enough to justify any interference in freedom. I? A deontological theory, in contrast, would be required either to rank the side constraints, which forbid agents from interfering in the free expression of others and from impairing the moral equality of others, or to admit defeat and claim that no adjudication between the two rights is possible. The latter admission is a grave failure since it would leave us no principled resolution of a serious policy question. But the former conclusion is hardly attractive either. Would we really wish to establish as true for all times and circumstances a lexical ordering between two side constraints on our actions without careful attention to consequences? Would we, for instance, really wish to establish that the slightest malign inegalitarian effect traceable to a form of expression is adequate grounds for an intrusive and costly censorship? Or would we, alternatively, really wish to establish that we should be prepared to tolerate a society horrible for women and children to live in, for the sake of not allowing any infringement on the sacred right of free expression?18 Consequentialist accounts can avoid such a deontological dilemma. In so doing, they show a certain healthy sense of realism about what life in society is like. In the world outside the theorist's study, we meet trade-offs at every tum. Every policy we make with some worthy end in Sight imposes costs in terms of diminished achievement of some other plausibly worthy end. Consequentialism demands that we grapple with these costs as directly as we can and justify their incurrence. It forbids us to dismiss them with moral sophistries or to ignore them as if we lived in an ideal world.

Util is a prerequisite to morality – death means the end of every right
Joseph S. Nye; Phd Political Science Harvard. University; Served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; 1986 “Nuclear Ethics” pg. 45-46

Is there any end that could justify a nuclear war that threatens the survival of the species? Is not all-out nuclear war just as self contradictory in the real world as pacifism is accused of being? Some people argue that "we are required to undergo gross injustice that will break many souls sooner than ourselves be the authors of mass murder."73 Still others say that "when a person makes survival the highest value, he has declared that there is nothing he will not betray. But for a civilization to sacrifice itself makes no sense since there are not survivors to give meaning to the sacrifical [sic] act. In that case, survival may be worth betrayal." Is it possible to avoid the "moral calamity of a policy like unilateral disarmament that forces us to choose between being dead or red (while increasing the chances of both)"?74 How one judges the issue of ends can be affected by how one poses the questions. If one asks "what is worth a billion lives (or the survival of the species)," it is natural to resist contemplating a positive answer. But suppose one asks, "is it possible to imagine any threat to our civilization and values that would justify raising the threat to a billion lives from one in ten thousand to one in a thousand for a specific period?" Then there are several plausible answers, including a democratic way of life and cherished freedoms that give meaning to life beyond mere survival. When we pursue several values simultaneously, we face the fact that they often conflict and that we face difficult tradeoffs. If we make one value absolute in priority, we are likely to get that value and little else. Survival is a necessary condition for the enjoyment of other values, but that does not make it sufficient. Logical priority does not make it an absolute value. Few people act as though survival were an absolute value in their personal lives, or they would never enter an automobile. We can give survival of the species a very high priority without giving it the paralyzing status of an absolute value. Some degree of risk is unavoidable if individuals or societies are to avoid paralysis and enhance the quality of life beyond mere survival. The degree of that risk is a justifiable topic of both prudential and moral reasoning.


Consequences come first for governments - only our evidence draws the distinction between moral theories for individuals and governments
Owen Harries, editor of National Interest, 1994 The National Interest, Spring, p. 11

Performance is the test. Asked directly by a Western interviewer, "In principle, do you believe in one standard of human rights and free expression?", Lee immediately answers, "Look, it is not a matter of principle but of practice." This might appear to represent a simple and rather crude pragmatism. But in its context it might also be interpreted as an appreciation of the fundamental point made by Max Weber that, in politics, it is "the ethic of responsibility" rather than "the ethic of absolute ends" that is appropriate. While an individual is free to treat human rights as absolute, to be observed whatever the cost. Governments must weigh consequences and the competing claims of other ends. So once the enter the realm of politics, human rights have to take their place in a hierarchy of interests, including such basic things as national security and the promotion of prosperity.





Once an action enters the policy realm we must use a Consequentialist approach, this is necessary to minimize suffering and conflict.
Alastair J.H. Murray Professor of Political Theory at the University of Edinburgh 1994 Reconstructing Realism: between Power Politics and Cosmopolitan Ethics, p. 110
Weber emphasised that, while the 'absolute ethic of the gospel' must be taken seriously, it is inadequate to the tasks of evaluation presented by politics. Against this 'ethic of ultimate ends' — Gesinnung — he therefore proposed the 'ethic of responsibility' — Verantwortung. First, whilst the former dictates only the purity of intentions and pays no attention to consequences, the ethic of responsibility commands acknowledgement of the divergence between intention and result. Its adherent 'does not feel in a position to burden others with the results of his [or her] own actions so far as he was able to foresee them; he will say: these results are ascribed to my action'. Second, the 'ethic of ultimate ends' is incapable of dealing adequately with the moral dilemma presented by the necessity of using evil means to achieve moral ends: Everything that is striven for through political action operating with violent means and following an ethic of responsibility endangers the 'salvation of the soul.' If, however, one chases after the ultimate good in a war of beliefs, following a pure ethic of absolute ends, then the goals may be changed and discredited for generations, because responsibility for consequences is lacking. The 'ethic of responsibility', on the other hand, can accommodate this paradox and limit the employment of such means, because it accepts responsibility for the consequences which they imply. Thus, Weber maintains that only the ethic of responsibility can cope with the 'inner tension' between the 'demon of politics' and 'the god of love'. 9 The realists followed this conception closely in their formulation of a political ethic.10 This influence is particularly clear in Morgenthau.11 In terms of the first element of this conception, the rejection of a purely deontological ethic, Morgenthau echoed Weber's formulation, arguing that: the political actor has, beyond the general moral duties, a special moral responsibility to act wisely ... The individual, acting on his own behalf, may act unwisely without moral reproach as long as the consequences of his inexpedient action concern only [her or] himself. What is done in the political sphere by its very nature concerns others who must suffer from unwise action. What is here done with good intentions but unwisely and hence with disastrous results is morally defective; for it violates the ethics of responsibility to which all action affecting others, and hence political action par excellence, is subject.12